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I show that if preferences are quasi−linear (non−linear in goods x1, …, xn but linear in xn+1)
and the sub−utility function defined over [x1, …, xn] is strongly concave and exhibits
Auspitz−Lieben−Pareto complementarity, then goods x1−xn must be gross and compensated
complements for each other and xn+1 must be a compensated substitute for all other goods.
Also, an increase in its price of xn+1 must reduce the demand for goods x1−xn. The effects
of uncompensated changes in the prices of goods x1−xn on the demand for good xn+1 vary
predictably with income.
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The general quasi-linear utility function, 
v(x) = u(x1, x2, ..., xn) + xn+1,          ( 1 )  
has found wide application in economic theory, especially in cases where analytical tractability 
requires eliminating income effects from the analysis at hand.  While the best known applications of 
quasi-linear preferences no doubt include consumer surplus analysis and analysis of economies with 
public goods or externalities (see, e.g., the textbook treatment in Varian, 1992), quasi-linear 
preferences have also proven useful in analysis of optimal taxation (Weymark, 1987), rational 
expectations equilibria (Shi, 1988a), equilibria in insurance markets (Shi, 1988b), Nash equilibrium 
(Boylan, 1998), imperfect competition (Vives, 1999), and the construction of optimal sales 
mechanisms (Che and Gale, 2000), among others.   
Despite the widespread application of quasi-linear preferences, however, relatively little 
seems to be known regarding the comparative statics properties of demand functions derived from 
quasi-linear preferences, aside from the implications that the matrix of compensated cross price 
effects must be symmetric and negative semidefinite (which of course applies to demand functions 
derived from any maximizing any quasiconcave utility function subject to a linear budget 
constraint), that xn+1 is zero below a certain threshold income level, but is consumed in positive 
quantities and is necessarily normal above that level, and that the demand functions for x1 ... xn must 
be completely income inelastic above the threshold level of income at which xn+1 is demanded in a 
positive quantity.  For a discussion of our ignorance beyond these propositions, see, e.g., the 
apparent uncertainty concerning cross price effects for quasi-linear utility functions in Vives (1999, 
p. 145).  This note fills in part of this gap in the existing literature by deriving the cross price effects 
among all n+1 goods for quasi-linear utility functions for the special case where the sub-utility 
function, u( ), is twice continuously differentiable and strongly concave with all goods x1 ... xn 
exhibiting weak Auspitz-Lieben (1889)-Pareto (1909) complementarity, so that uij(x) ≥  0 for i ≠  j. 
Previous analyses of general (i.e., non quasi-linear) strongly concave utility functions with 
Auspitz-Lieben-Pareto complementarity include Chipman (1977),
1 who showed that if the utility 
function is strongly concave (which implies, among other restrictions, that all goods must have 
strictly diminishing marginal utility), so that its Hessian matrix is negative definite, then all goods 
will be normal and thus have downward sloping demand curves if all goods are weak Auspitz-
Lieben-Pareto complements.  More recently, Weber (2000, 2004) has shown that if u(x) is strongly 
concave and all goods are Auspitz-Lieben-Pareto complements, then:  1) all goods must be 
compensated (utility constant) substitutes; and 2) if an increase in pj increases the marginal utility of 
income, then all goods must be gross complements for good j in the sense that an uncompensated 
increase in the price of good j increases the demands for all other goods.
2   
Compared to the utility function considered by Chipman (1977) and Weber (2000, 2004), the 
functional form in (1) drops the assumption of strong concavity of v(x) since vn+1,n+1 = 0, replacing it 
with weak concavity. The functional form in (1) also replaces vi,n+1(x) ≥  0 with the stronger 
condition vi,n+1(x) = 0.  It is well known that if the demand for xn+1 is positive, then the demands for 
goods x1 ... xn are completely income inelastic, which shows, not surprisingly that Chipman’s (1977) 
result that for strongly concave utility with Auspitz-Lieben-Pareto complementarity, all goods are 
normal does not extend to all non-strictly concave utility functions.  The purpose of this note is to 
 
  1determine how sensitive the empirical implications derived in Weber (2000, 2004) are to the same 
changes in the structure of the household’s preferences.  We will see below that these apparently 
minor changes in the household’s preference structure also lead to results for cross price effects 
which are quite different from those developed in Weber (2000, 2004).   
 
2.  Comparative Statics for Quasi-Linear Utility with Auspitz-Lieben Complementarity 
 
I begin by examining the signs of the cross price effects for all goods other than good n+1. 
Let p = [p1, p2, ..., pn+1] and I denote, respectively, the vector of prices which the household 
faces and household income.  Let ΩI denote the set of price-income pairs with pi > 0, i ∈ {1, ..., 
n+1} and I > 0.  The household’s Marshallian or uncompensated demand function will be denoted h: 
 ΩI  → ℜ+
n+1.  The range of h will be denoted X = {x:  x = h(p, I) for some (p, I) ∈ ΩI}.  To begin, 
we have:  
 
THEOREM: Assume that the household’s preferences generate a single-valued, differentiable 
demand function, h(p, I), defined on ΩI and satisfying the budget identity: 
 
p·h(p, I) = I   for all  (p, I) ∈ ΩI.         ( 2 )  
with hn+1 > 0.  Let ΩI
0 be a neighborhood whose image X
0 = h(ΩI
0) is in the interior of ℜ+
n+1.  
Assume that the household’s preferences over X
0 can be represented by a real valued, twice 
continuously differentiable function v:  X
0 → ℜ
1, which satisfies: 
 
(i)  quasi-linearity:  v(x) = u(x1, x2, ..., xn) + xn+1; 
(ii)  strong concavity of u:  for all i and j ∈ {1, …, n}, the matrix U(x) ≡  [u ij(x)] ≡ 
[∂
2u(x)/∂xi∂xj] is negative definite; 
(iii) weak Auspitz-Lieben-Pareto complementarity:  for all i and j ∈ {1, …, n} and i ≠  j, 
uij(x) ≥  0. 
 
Then ∂hi(p, I)/∂pj ≤  0 for all i and j ∈ {1, …, n}, i ≠  j and (p, I) ∈ ΩI
0. 
 
PROOF:  For hn+1 > 0, it is well established that assumption (i) implies that the marginal utility of 
income depends only on pn+1 and that changes in I do not affect xi for i ∈ {1, …, n}.  Together, these 
two facts imply that for i ∈ {1, …, n}, the hi’s jointly solve:
3 
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Under the conditions stated in the theorem, the first order conditions for solving (3) are given by: 
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Differentiating each of the n different versions of (4) and using a mathematical result due to 
McKenzie (1960),
4 Rader (1968) has shown that conditions (i)-(iii) imply ∂hi(p, I)/∂pj ≤  0,
5 which 
was the result to be shown.   
 
  This theorem immediately implies the following corollaries: 
 
  2COROLLARY 1:  Since assumption (i) of theorem 1 implies that income effects are zero for goods 
1-n, the Slutsky equation implies that goods 1-n must be compensated complements for each other.  
 
COROLLARY 2:  Since each good must have at least one compensated substitute (Hicks, 1946), 
corollary 1 implies that good n+1 must be a compensated substitute for each of goods 1-n. 
 
  Corollaries 1 and 2 imply that the sign pattern for the symmetric (n+1)
2 matrix of 
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It bears emphasizing that the functional form in (1) is not the only one which results in this 
sign pattern.  It has been known since Slutsky (1915) that when v(x) is additively separable, at most 
one good can have increasing marginal utility if the second order conditions for a constrained 
maximum are to be satisfied.  Hicks and Allen (1934) showed that in the case of three goods the two 
goods with diminishing marginal utility must be compensated complements for each other and 
compensated substitutes for the good with increasing marginal utility.  Silberberg (1972) generalized 
this result to the case of an arbitrary number of goods:  the one good with increasing marginal utility 
will be a compensated substitute for all of the other goods, while the remaining goods will be 
compensated complements for each other.   
To shed further light on the uncompensated cross price effects, we use the Slutsky equation 
explicitly.  Thus, assume that the household chooses x to minimize its money expenditure, E = p·x, 
subject to the constant utility constraint, v(x) = v
0.  Let Ωv denote the set of price-utility pairs such 
that pi > 0, i ∈ {1, 2, ... n+1} and v
0 is finite.  The household’s Hicksian or compensated demand 
function is denoted s:  Ωv  → ℜ+
n+1.  The range of s is X = {x:  x = s(p, v
0) for some (p, v
0) ∈ Ωv}. 
 Thus, the Slutsky equation for the effect of a change in pn+1 is:  
























Since, ∂hi/∂I = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2, ... n}, equation (5) and corollary 2 jointly yield: 
 
COROLLARY 3:  For i ∈ {1, 2, ... n}, goods i and n+1 are gross substitutes in the sense that  


















Finally, the Slutsky equation for the effect of a change in pj on the demand for xn+1 is:  
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Since it is easily shown that with pn+1 held constant ∂hn+1/∂I = 1/pn+1, multiplying (7) through by 
pj/hn+1 to obtain the Slutsky equation in elasticity form yields: 
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From corollary 2, ε
s
n+1,j is positive.  Thus, the sign of ε
h
n+1,j depends on the relative magnitudes of 
ε
s
n+1,j and pjhj/pn+1hn+1.  It is well known that quasi-linear preferences imply a threshold level of 
income below which hn+1 = 0 and above which any changes in income affect only hn+1.  Thus, if 
ε
s
n+1,j is bounded above as income changes, equation (8) implies that good n+1 will be a gross 
complement for good n+1 only for sufficiently low income levels where pjhj/pn+1hn+1 is relatively 
large.  Above the threshold, as income and hence hn+1 rises while pj, hj, and pn+1 all remain constant, 
pjhj/pn+1hn+1 falls monotonically, so that with ε
s
n+1,j bounded above, the expression on the righthand 
side of (8) turns positive and goods j and n+1 become gross substitutes.  This establishes: 
 
LEMMA:  Assume that conditions (i)-(iii) of the theorem hold and in addition that ε
s
n+1,j is bounded 
above for all (p, I) ∈ ΩI
0.  Then there exists I* such that I < I* implies ε
h
n+1,j < 0, while I > I* 
implies ε
h
n+1,j > 0. 
 
Recall that all of the uncompensated own price effects are non-positive since no good is 
inferior.  Since the (n+1)
2 matrix of uncompensated cross price effects is generally asymmetric, we 
define this matrix such that the entry in row i column j gives the effect of a change in pj on hi. 
Assuming that the conditions stated in the theorem hold and that ε
s
n+1,j is bounded above as income 
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3.  Conclusion 
 
Chipman (1977) and Weber (2000, 2004) have shown that in the general (non quasi-linear) 
case, strong concavity and Auspitz-Lieben-Pareto  complementarity (which includes additive 
separability and diminishing marginal utility for all goods as a special case) imply that:   
 
1) all goods must be normal and hence have downward sloping demand curves;  
2) all goods must be compensated substitutes;  
3) if an increase in pj increases the marginal utility of income, then all goods must be gross  
complements for good j.     
   It is well known that the first of these results no longer holds when the overall utility 
function, v(x) is quasi-linear.  This note has shown specifically how the second and third results also 
change when the overall utility function is quasi-linear and the sub-utility function is strongly 
concave and exhibits Auspitz-Lieben-Pareto complementarity.  Specifically, these restrictions imply 
that the goods in the sub-utility function, u(x1, x2, ..., xn), must be both gross and compensated 
complements for each other; also, for sufficiently small income, ∂hn+1(p, I)/∂pj has a different sign 
than ∂hi(p, I)/∂pj, i ∈ {1, 2, ... n}. 
One of the results developed here merits further attention.  Specifically, since quasi-linear 
preferences imply zero income elasticities for goods x1, ..., xn, the fact that those goods must be 
gross and compensated complements suggests a possible connection between inferiority (in the weak 
sense of a non-positive income elasticity) and complementarity.  Since this is not the first paper to 
imply such a connection (see, e.g., the related analyses of Liebhafsky (1969) and Silberberg (1972), 
who jointly demonstrate such a connection under additive separability of the utility function), a 
further analysis of the apparent connection between complementarity and inferiority might prove 
fruitful.  In particular, it would be interesting to know at a deeper level why weak inferiority and 
complementarity seem to be linked together. 
 
  5NOTES 
 
1.  Following standard practice, Chipman (1977) refers to Auspitz-Lieben-Pareto 
complementarity as Auspitz-Lieben-Edgeworth (1897)-Pareto complementarity.  However, a closer 
examination of Edgeworth’s discussion in his paper on monopoly (Edgeworth, 1897) shows that in 
fact, Edgeworth’s approach to complementarity was much more modern than that of his 
contemporaries, in that it went beyond a classification based on the signs of the second order cross 
partial derivatives of the utility function and focused instead on the signs of the “cross quantity 
effects” in the inverse demand functions.  See Weber (2003) for a more detailed discussion.  
  
2.  Defining gross substitutability and complementarity by the impact of a change in the price 
of good j on the demand for all other goods rather than by the impacts of changes in the prices of 
other goods on the demand for good j is important since, unlike compensated cross price effects, 
gross cross price effects are generally not symmetric and thus may have different signs, so that the 
definition of two goods as gross complements or gross substitutes may depend on which price is 
assumed to change. 
 
3.  Note that we could also derive (3) by letting xn+1 be the numéraire, solving the budget 
constraint for xn+1, substituting the result into (1) to yield v(x) = u(x1, x2, ..., xn) + I – Σ
n
i=1pixi, and 
observing that with I fixed choosing x1, ..., xn to maximize this version of v(x) is equivalent to 
choosing x1, ..., xn to maximize the function in (3). 
 
4. For other, related applications of McKenzie’s result, see Chipman (1977) and Weber 
(2000, 2004).  
 
5.  Technically, Rader interpreted (3) as a profit maximization problem in which u(x1, ..., xn) 
is a production function and the xi’s and pi’s are productive inputs and real factor prices, 
respectively.  However, the mathematical structure of Rader’s problem and of the problem 
considered here are identical so that they do not depend on the particular economic interpretation 
attached to u( ), xi, or pi.  Hence, the comparative statics of the model do not depend on the 
economic meaning of these symbols.  Thus, the result ∂hi(p, I)/∂pj ≤  0 applies equally well to 
Rader’s profit maximization problem and to the utility maximization problem with quasi-linear 
preferences considered here.  
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